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ABSTRACT 
 
This study seeks to examine if boards consider CEO educational and functional background when choosing a new 
CEO. It also examines which factors determine whether the board of directors will seek an incoming CEO with a 
different educational and/or functional background from that of the current CEO. Using a sample of 832 
successions between 1992 and 2009, we found that the outgoing CEO characteristics and the firm characteristics 
influence the selection of the incoming CEO functional backgrounds. We found an increase in the likelihood of firms 
hiring incoming CEOs with the same functional backgrounds as the outgoing CEOs. Incoming CEOs with functional 
backgrounds in engineering/manufacturing are more likely to be hired by research-oriented firms. 
 
Incoming CEOs with functional backgrounds in accounting/finance are more likely to be hired by poorly performing 
firms. We also find that firms are more likely to change the functional background of the successor relative to the 
predecessor when there has been poor prior performance and the firm has higher institutional investor ownership. 
 
Keywords: CEO Succession; Functional Background; Educational Background 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
here has been considerable research on the CEO turnover and succession process. However, there has 
been relatively little research on how boards actually select successors, despite the belief held by 
many that selecting the CEO is the most important decision that a board of directors makes (Larcker 
et al., 2014). Most prior research has focused on the choice of outside vs. inside successions (Finkelstein et al., 
2009). Parrino (1997) and Custodio et al. (2013) find that boards tend to select outside successors from 
homogeneous industries where the successor CEOs may have transferable skills. Farrell and Whidbee (2003) and 
Favaro et al. (2010) find that boards are more likely to choose an outside CEO when the firm is expected to have 
poor performance and uncertainty is high. Allgood and Farrell (2003) show that boards are more likely to choose an 
outside CEO when the predecessor has been terminated after a short tenure. Naveen (2006) finds that large multi-
division firms with greater organizational complexity tend to choose an inside CEO since in this case firm-specific 
knowledge is essential and difficult to transfer from any other industry. Taken as a whole, this research suggests that 
where the hired CEO is from (i.e., industry or inside/outside the firm) matters, so it is reasonable to expect that CEO 
experience matters (Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998). Thus, CEO background is important to boards when they make 
succession decisions, but research has not definitively quantified how boards select successors and how they 
determine if a successor will fit the company’s needs. 
 
One of the contributions of our study is that, unlike prior research which has examined CEO characteristics and firm 
outcomes after the hiring of a new CEO (Koyuncu et al., 2010), we are looking at firm characteristics as being 
motivators for the CEO hires. That is to say, we take the firm characteristics as the determinants rather than the 
T 
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outcome of hiring decisions. To the best of our knowledge, our study is one of the first studies to examine the 
matching of incoming CEO background to firm characteristics. This is important because it allows our research to 
make a value added contribution in an extensively researched area. 
 
Another contribution of our study is that we highlight the CEO background (functional and educational) instead of 
focusing on the dichotomous succession origin. According to a 2013 survey by the Rock Center for Corporate 
Governance and The Miles Group, boards are not necessarily adept or skilled in evaluating the potential incoming 
CEOs. Our study makes a contribution by attempting to examine how boards can use firm characteristics and 
outgoing CEO characteristics to motivate the incoming CEO characteristics, such as functional and educational 
background. We believe that our study will help shed light on how firm characteristics and outgoing CEO 
characteristics can help in achieving a better CEO-Firm fit. There has been prior research that examined job 
matching and organizational fit (Javanovic, 1979; Smith and White, 1987; Garen, 1988; Allgood and Farrell, 2003; 
Ryan and Wang, 2011; Kaplan et al., 2012; Huang, 2014). 
 
We address two research questions. Do boards consider CEO educational and functional background when choosing 
a new CEO? What factors determine whether the board of directors will seek an incoming CEO with a different 
educational and/or functional background from that of the current CEO?1 
 
In this study we find that the outgoing CEO and the firm characteristics do influence the choice of the successor’s 
functional background and that there is a matching of CEO degrees to firm characteristics.  Research and 
development oriented firms are more likely to hire CEOs with the functional background that would permit them to 
understand the firm’s research process. Riskier firms are less likely to hire CEOs with a degree from an Ivy League 
institution. Smaller firms are more likely to hire CEOs with lower levels of education. We also find that firms are 
more likely to change the functional background of the successor relative to the predecessor when there has been 
poor prior performance and the firm has higher institutional investor ownership. 
 
BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
CEO Educational Background 
 
There is significant literature on CEO educational background and its effects on the firm. There are two branches of 
research2 when it comes to the topic of how CEO education influences the firm. The first branch of research 
examines the relation between the type of education of the CEO and the behavior of the firm. For example, 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), Tyler and Steensma (1998), and Barker and Mueller (2002) all find that the type 
of degree that the CEO holds has an impact on the firm’s research and development funding.  Graham and Harvey 
(2001, 2002) and Graham et al. (2005), find that CEOs and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) holding MBAs were 
more likely than other executives to use techniques such as net present value for capital budgeting and the capital 
asset pricing model in cost of capital calculations. CEOs with MBAs tend to be more aggressive, on average, 
choosing to engage in a higher level of capital expenditures, holding more debt, and paying smaller dividends 
(Bertrand and Scholar, 2003). 
 
In addition, several studies have shown a relation between education level and rate of corporate innovation, or the 
likelihood of strategic change (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Advanced management 
education, in particular, may solidify common beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions about normative or proper 
strategic decision making (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Hambrick and Mason (1984) also suggest that advanced 
education both encourages and indicates a preference for administrative complexity. 
 
The second branch of research investigates the relation between the selectively of the CEO’s education and firm 
performance. Deary (2004) and Frey and Ditterman (2004) both report that entrance exam scores are strongly 
correlated with intelligence tests, and hence it may be that CEOs from highly selective schools are better run firms 
due to the fact that they can process more information (Elsaid, 2014). Moreover, Burt (1992) and Belliveau et al. 
(1996) find that CEOs from more selective schools enjoy stronger ties to government officials which can improve 
the performance of the firm. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) finds some evidence that firms with CEOs that lack an Ivy 
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League undergraduate degree may have worse performance. Bertrand and Scholar (2003) find that CEOs who hold 
MBA degrees are associated with higher operating return on assets. On the other hand, Gottesman and Morey (2010) 
find no evidence that the type or selectively of education of the CEO is related to firm financial performance. 
 
Bhagat et al. (2010) show that the decision to replace a CEO has nothing to do with the CEO’s education and 
everything to do with his/her performance. Despite of this result, education is an important factor in the hiring of the 
incoming CEO. The Bhagat et al. (2010) results lead to the puzzling implication that, while CEO education appears 
to play an important role in the hiring of CEOs, it does not affect the long-term firm performance. 
 
CEO Functional Background 
 
Career experiences or functional background may be an important characteristic when boards search for a new CEO 
(Beal and Yasai-Ardekani, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2001), and functional background has attracted the attention of 
researchers (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Smith and White, 1987; Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Ocasio and Kim, 1999; 
Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002; Bunderson, 2003; Herrmann and Datta, 2005; 
Koyuncu et al., 2010). Functional background is important because the work experiences top managers bring to their 
jobs has a direct influence on how they define problems (Dearborn and Simon, 1958), how they make strategic 
choices (Hitt and Ireland, 1985; Smith and White, 1987; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001), and how they process 
information (Walsh, 1988). In turn, these factors will likely affect both organizational performance (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1984) and the career outcomes of managers (Sheridan et al., 1990). The CEO’s functional 
background is one of the ways the firm communicates the priorities that it is setting. It reflects the firm’s culture, 
values and potential strategic direction (Smith and White, 1987; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; Koyuncu et al., 
2010). 
 
Historically, the preferences for CEO functional backgrounds have shifted with the changes in business 
environment. For example, during the period between 1925 and 1950 CEOs often had a manufacturing and 
operations background (Newcomer, 1955). This trend shifted in the 1960s and 1970s when the majority of 
executives who climbed the corporate ladder to the CEO position in large U.S. organizations had a finance 
background (Fligstein, 1987). In the 1980s and the early 1990s there was a reversal in trends and the majority of 
CEOs had a functional background in operations (Ocasio and Kim, 1999). The prevalence of CEOs with a functional 
background in operations continued between 1992 and 2005 (Koyuncu et al., 2010). 
 
Pfeffer (1981) and Useem and Karabel (1986) suggest that functional background provides a salient basis for 
executive selection. Chaganti and Sambharya (1987), Murray (1989), Michel and Hambrick (1992) and Westphal 
and Zajac (1995) determine the new CEOs’ functional backgrounds by examining the prior job titles and 
employment history. They define three categories of functional backgrounds. Output functional backgrounds include 
positions in marketing and sales. Throughput functional backgrounds include positions in operations, R&D and 
engineering. Peripheral functional backgrounds include positions in law, finance and accounting. 
 
Dearborn and Simon (1958) show that executives selectively perceive and identify company problems depending on 
their functional area, suggesting that executives with primary experience in a particular functional area tend to have 
similar viewpoints on the sources of poor performance. Waller et al. (1995) find that top executives were more 
aware of changes in organizational effectiveness related to their own functional backgrounds; for instance, 
executives with a functional background in operations were more sensitive to changes in operational efficiency for 
the organization. Thus, functional background may influence executives’ perceptions and beliefs about the most 
important strategic issues facing the firm (Smith and White, 1987; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). 
 
Prior research (e.g., Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Guthrie and Datta, 1997) shows that poorly performing firms tend to 
prefer CEOs with throughput functional experience. As a result, the value of a CEO’s functional experience and 
expertise may be viewed as contingent on the firm's recent performance history. Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue 
that throughput functional experience stereotypically indicates an internal orientation and possession of skills 
necessary to improve efficiency and accounting-based performance measures; skills which are more likely to be 
favored during times of reduced firm profitability. Koyuncu et al. (2010) find no significant differences between the 
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influences of an operations background and other backgrounds on post-succession performance. Their results imply 
that the CEO’s functional background is not a strong predictor of firm performance. 
Guthrie and Datta (1997) also show a strong relation between investments in marketing and promotion (i.e., 
advertising intensity) and selected CEOs' functional experience3. Higher levels of advertising intensity were 
associated with hiring CEOs having experience in output rather than throughput functional areas. 
 
Testable Hypotheses 
 
Our testable hypotheses build on the conceptual framework and empirical results of the managerial pedigree 
literature. Our first hypothesis focuses on CEO selection in the context of matching CEO background to firm 
characteristics. The match between the CEO and the firm is an important consideration. Firms should choose CEOs 
with traits that match firm needs since the CEOs’ skill set and experience influences firm policies, performance, and 
value. We propose that the board of directors will seek to hire a new CEO with a background that best fits with the 
structural or cultural characteristics of the firm. The firm characteristics may be observable, allowing for clear 
predictions of the requisite background needed to manage the organization. For example, companies with high levels 
of R&D expenditures may be more likely to hire a CEO with a throughput background (Datta and Guthrie, 1994). 
On the other hand, important characteristics of the firm, such as organizational culture, may be unobservable. When 
the former CEO has been successful or when firm-specific knowledge is essential, firms are more likely to hire a 
successor CEO that possesses similar pedigree as the predecessor (Smith and White, 1987; Vancil, 1987). As such, 
the best indicator of organizational fit may be the pedigree of the former CEO. Specifically, we propose that the new 
CEO is more likely to have a functional or educational background similar to the former CEO, on average.  So our 
first hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The new CEO is likely to have a functional background that is similar to the predecessor’s 
background. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The new CEO is likely to have an educational background that is similar to the predecessor’s 
background. 
 
Our second hypothesis examines instances where the board of directors may be more likely to seek a change in CEO 
pedigree by hiring a new CEO with a different functional or educational background than the outgoing CEO. Here, 
the board of directors will seek to hire a new CEO with a different functional or educational background than the 
outgoing CEO when there is greater pressure from shareholders, either actual or perceived, to make a change. For 
example, while firms may seek to hire new CEOs with similar backgrounds to the outgoing CEO (i.e., those most 
likely to have greater fit with the firm), the board of directors may want to make a change when past performance is 
poor or when the CEO succession is forced. In such cases, the hiring of a new CEO with a different functional or 
educational background than the outgoing CEO may signal to the market that the board of directors is seeking to 
make a change in strategy and/or culture. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of a change in CEO functional and/or educational background relative to the 
incumbent CEO is greater when the board of directors faces greater pressure to make a change. 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
 
Sample Selection 
 
We identify CEO successions using the Execucomp database. Execucomp includes annual compensation data from 
proxy statements for the five highest paid executives of firms in the S&P 1500 and contains 3,080 different firms 
from 1992 to 2009. Following Cremers and Grinstein (2009), we identify the executive who is the CEO using the 
variable CEOANN. This results in a sample of 27,278 firm years where an executive is identified as the CEO. 
Execucomp also provides the year in which the CEO was appointed as the CEO (BECAMECEO). This results in a 
sample of 25,776 firm years with data necessary to determine the year in which the succession occurred and 1,877 
firm years in which the current CEO is classified as new. 
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We then randomly4 select 940 firm years (~50%) and use firm proxy statements and the Marquis Who’s Who 
database to collect data for each CEO’s prior job titles and employment history. Overall, we obtain CEO functional 
and educational background information for 832 CEO successions for 476 Execucomp firms from 1992 to 2009. We 
lose 4 observations because we are unable to determine the age or tenure of the outgoing CEO. We lose 2 
observations because we are unable to determine whether the new CEO joined the company from the outside or 
whether the succession was voluntary or forced. This reduces our sample to 826 CEO successions from 1992 to 
2009. 
 
We then match this data with Compustat for accounting data. This results in a matched sample of 778 CEO 
successions from 1992 to 2009. We also match with the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) for stock 
price data. This results in a matched sample of 682 CEO successions from 1992 to 2009. We also match with the 
Thomson 13F (13F) database for institutional ownership data. This results in a matched sample of 680 CEO 
successions from 1992 to 2009. Finally, we match with the RiskMetrics (1995 to 2007) and Equilar (2008 and 
2009)5 databases for board of director characteristics (i.e., board size and the percentage of independent directors). 
 
Due to data limitations in RiskMetrics, board characteristics are only available from fiscal year 1995 onward, which 
further reduces our sample size when using board of director variables to 420.6 
 
Variable Descriptions 
 
Our primary dependent variables are the functional and educational background of the new CEO and whether the 
new CEO has a different functional or educational background than the outgoing CEO. Our primary independent 
variables are functional and educational background of the outgoing CEO. We also include several additional 
control variables to proxy for firm specific factors. Table 1 describes the construction of the variables and data 
sources in more detail. 
 
Table 1. Variable descriptions 
This table describes the construction of the variables and data sources 
Variable Name Definition Data Source 
CEO Functional Background   
FDRMAJ 
CEO is a founder, co-founder, founding 
family member, majority shareholder, or 
member of majority shareholding family. 
Proxy Statements and Marquis Who’s 
Who 
OUTPUT CEO has primary experience in output related functions, such as marketing or sales. 
Proxy Statements and Marquis Who’s 
Who 
THRPUT 
CEO has primary experience in throughput 
related functions, such as operations, R&D, or 
engineering. 
Proxy Statements and Marquis Who’s 
Who 
PERIPH CEO has primary experience in peripheral functions, such as law, finance, or accounting. 
Proxy Statements and Marquis Who’s 
Who 
CEO Educational Background   
NODEGR CEO has no undergraduate degree (university or college). 
Proxy Statements, Marquis Who’s Who 
and Bloomberg 
UNDER Highest degree obtained by the CEO is an undergraduate degree. 
Proxy Statements, Marquis Who’s Who 
and Bloomberg 
MASTER 
Highest degree obtained by the CEO is 
masters degree, Juris Doctorate, or LLB. 
Bachelor of Laws (abbreviated LL.B., LLB or 
rarely Ll.B.) is an undergraduate, or bachelor, 
degree in law 
Proxy Statements, Marquis Who’s Who 
and Bloomberg 
PHD Highest degree obtained by the CEO is a Ph.D. degree. 
Proxy Statements, Marquis Who’s Who 
and Bloomberg 
IVY CEO has any degree from an Ivy League school. 
Proxy Statements, Marquis Who’s Who 
and Bloomberg 
(Table 1 continued on next page) 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2016 Volume 32, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1184 The Clute Institute 
 
(Table 1 continued) 
 
Other CEO Variables   
OTENURE 
Number of years the outgoing CEO has held 
the title of CEO at the firm. Calculated as the 
difference between the year of the observation 
and the year in which the executive became 
CEO. Data source: Proxy statements and 
Execucomp. 
Proxy statements and Execucomp 
OAGE The age of the outgoing CEO at the time of the succession observation. Proxy statements and Execucomp 
Succession Variables   
NUMSUC The total number of successions within the firm over the sample period. Proxy statements and Execucomp 
FORCED A binary variable equal to 1 if the succession is forced and 0 otherwise. News announcements and Execucomp 
OUTSIDE A binary variable equal to 1 if the new CEO is from outside the firm and 0 otherwise. Proxy statements and Execucomp 
Firm Level Control Variables   
RET12 
The 12-month cumulative annualized return 
(the product of one plus the monthly stock 
returns for the12 months of the firm’s fiscal 
year). 
CRSP 
ROA Operating income before depreciation/total assets = (DATA13/DATA6) x 100. COMPUSTAT 
TD/TA Total debt/total assets = ((DATA34 + DATA9)/DATA6) x 100. COMPUSTAT 
LNSALES Natural logarithm of total sales = LN(DATA12). COMPUSTAT 
Q 
Tobin’s Q =  (Market value of equity plus the 
book value of debt)/total assets = 
(DATA25*DATA199+DATA6-
DATA60)/DATA6. Calculated following 
Smith and Watts (1992). 
COMPUSTAT 
R&D/SALES 
Research and development expense/total sales 
= ((DATA46 or 0 if missing)/DATA12) x 
100. 
COMPUSTAT 
ADV/SALES Advertising expense/total sales = ((DATA45 or 0 if missing)/DATA12) x 100. COMPUSTAT 
CAPX/SALES Capital expenditures/total sales = (DATA128/DATA12) x 100. 
COMPUSTAT, CRSP, Governance 
Variables 
SDRET36 
The annualized standard deviation of the 
firm’s monthly stock returns for the prior 36 
months. 
EXECUCOMP and Proxy Statements 
DUALITY 
An indicator variable equals to one if the CEO 
is also the chairman of the board, zero 
otherwise. 
EXECUCOMP and Proxy Statements 
BDSIZE Number of directors on the board. RiskMetrics and Equilar 
PIND Percentage of independent directors on the board. RiskMetrics and Equilar 
INSTOWN Percentage of institutional ownership at fiscal year end. Thomson 13F 
 
CEO Functional Background 
 
We follow prior research by Chaganti and Sambharya (1987), Murray (1989), Michel and Hambrick (1992) and 
Westphal and Zajac (1995) in determining the CEOs’ functional backgrounds by examining the prior job titles and 
employment history. Output functional backgrounds (OUTPUT) include positions in marketing and sales. 
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Throughput functional backgrounds (THRPUT) include positions in operations, R&D and engineering. Peripheral 
functional backgrounds (PERIPH) include positions in law, finance, and accounting. We use firm proxy statements 
and the Marquis Who’s Who database to collect data for CEOs’ prior job titles and employment history. A caveat of 
the classifications of CEO functional backgrounds in our study is that the vast majority of CEOs (more than 95%) 
have had experience in two or more areas as they were rising in the ranks of a company or companies. In these 
cases, we use the functional area where the CEO spent the most time to determine the CEO’s functional background. 
 
CEO Educational Background 
 
We follow prior research by Westphal and Zajac (1995), Zajac and Westphal (1996) and Elsaid (2014) in 
determining the CEOs’ educational backgrounds. Similar to Elsaid (2014).  
 
“we divide the CEOs’ educational backgrounds into four categories: those with no undergraduate degree 
(NODEGR), those where the highest degree obtained is an undergraduate degree (UNDER), those where 
the highest degree obtained is a Masters degree (or its equivalent) (MASTER) and those where the highest 
degree obtained is a PhD degree (PHD).”  
 
We combine the categories no degree and undergraduate degree into the category non-graduate degree and the 
categories masters degree and Ph.D. into the category graduate degree (GRADUATE) due to low cell count in the 
no degree and Ph.D. categories.7 We include Ivy League affiliation (IVY) as part of the CEOs’ educational 
background. We use firm proxy statements, the Marquis Who’s Who database and Bloomberg to collect data for 
each CEOs’ prior education. 
 
Controls 
 
We control for the outgoing CEO age and tenure. We use firm proxy statements and Execucomp to collect data on 
CEO characteristics. The CEO age and tenure could be an indication on how well the CEO manages the firm. 
Alderfer (1986) suggests that upper level managers with limited experience will likely be less effective in running 
their companies. Older, more experienced CEOs with longer tenures are more likely to have a better understanding 
of the firm, its industry, and management practices, in general. This could translate into better firm performance. 
 
We use firm proxy statements and Execucomp to determine the number of CEO successions for each firm 
over our sample period. Similar to Elsaid (2014)  
 
“we examine the column “REASON” in the Execucomp database, which explains why the named CEO left 
the company. It provides four different reasons: resigned, retired, deceased, or unknown. We verify the 
reason listed in Execucomp by searching the Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI) and the Wall Street Journal 
(WSJ) for the reasons for the succession. From the news stories, we classify voluntary successions as all 
CEO successions arising from retirement (CEOs over age 60)8, death, illness, or those involving the CEO’s 
departure for a better and more prestigious position in another firm. We set a dummy variable equal to one 
in cases where the CEO was forced to leave, and zero in cases where the CEO departure was voluntary 
(FORCED).” 
 
We determine whether the predecessor CEO joined the company from the outside. Outside succession seems to 
occur more frequently following poor performance (Boeker and Goodstein, 1993; Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993). 
Similar to Elsaid et al., (2009) we consider that “by hiring an outsider, the board may be sending “a signal that a 
major change is necessary and that no insider can bring the fresh perspective that is required” (Vancil, 1987, p. 57). 
Accordingly, we set a dummy variable equal to one in cases where the CEO joined the company from the outside, 
and zero otherwise (OUTSIDE).” 
 
We proxy for effective monitoring by the board of directors using three measures:  
 
1) Board size (BDSIZE)  
2) The percentage of independent directors on the board (PIND)  
3) CEO duality (DUALITY)  
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First, we measure board size as the number of directors serving on the board during the year. Next, we classify 
directors as insiders (those who are current employees of the firm) and outsiders (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Elsaid 
et al., 2009). We then create a variable for the percent of outside board directors which is calculated as the ratio of 
outside directors scaled by total directors on the board. Regulators and academics believe that outside (independent) 
directors are generally more effective monitors than inside (non-independent) directors. For example, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the exchange rules in 2002 require that the majority of the board be independent, while numerous 
studies link the proportion of outside directors to financial performance and shareholder wealth (e.g., Rosenstein and 
Wyatt, 1990; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Brickley et al., 1994; Cotter et al., 1997). We also determine whether the 
CEO holds the title of CEO and COB (Chairman of the Board) and create a dummy variable equal to one in such 
cases, and zero otherwise. CEO duality may concentrate power in the CEO’s position and allow the CEO to control 
information available to other directors impeding effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993). 
 
Further, we control for institutional investor ownership percentage. We expect that institutional ownership 
percentage may proxy for the level of external pressure faced by a firm to change CEO functional or educational 
background when past performance is poor. We calculate institutional ownership percentage (INSTOWN) as the 
percentage of common shares outstanding held by institutions during the year. 
 
Lastly, we control for several firm specific factors. We expect that CEO succession and successor choice is highly 
correlated with firm performance. Therefore, we control for stock performance (RET12) and accounting 
performance (ROA). We proxy for growth opportunities and information asymmetry using Tobin’s Q (Q), the level 
of R&D expenditures (R&D/SALES), the level of advertising expenditures (ADV/SALES), and stock return 
volatility (SDRET36). Jensen (1993) argues that the monitoring of high growth firms is costly, while Fama and 
Jensen (1983) suggest that firms with higher stock return volatility have higher levels of information asymmetry. We 
also control for firm size (LNSALES) and total debt to total assets (TD/TA). We lag the measurement of firm 
specific control variables by one year (t= −1) relative to the CEO succession year (t = 0). 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel B provides a breakdown of CEO functional 
backgrounds split by outgoing and new CEO. Panel C provides a breakdown of CEO educational background. Panel 
D provides a breakdown of CEO Ivy league affiliation. Panel E provides a breakdown of successions by year and 
Panel F provides a breakdown of the industries in our sample by the 17 Fama and French (1997) industry 
classifications. 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for estimation sample 
Variable Mean sd Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
RET12t-1 0.12 0.43 -0.83 -0.13 0.08 0.30 2.94 
ROAt-1 13.80 13.63 -166.84 9.79 13.93 19.04 71.85 
TD/TAt-1 24.35 18.74 0.00 10.46 23.10 35.85 152.38 
SALESt-1 4421.95 11497.82 0.27 399.44 1206.80 3772.00 160123.00 
Qt-1 1.89 1.24 0.40 1.20 1.47 2.09 10.98 
R&D/SALESt-1 5.51 33.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.17 675.00 
ADV/SALESt-1 1.08 2.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 31.39 
SDRET36t-1 0.34 0.16 0.10 0.22 0.31 0.43 1.26 
OAGE 59.42 7.82 35.00 54.00 60.00 65.00 84.00 
OTENURE 8.92 8.16 0.00 3.00 6.58 12.00 48.00 
NUMSUCC 0.32 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 
FORCED 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
OUTSIDE 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
DUALITY 0.70 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
BDSIZE 9.95 2.74 4.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 21.00 
PIND 0.64 0.18 0.50 0.67 0.78 0.94 1.00 
INSTOWN 58.34 21.23 1.75 44.29 60.02 73.05 100.00 
(Table 2 continued on next page) 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2016 Volume 32, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1187 The Clute Institute 
 
(Table 2 continued) 
 
Panel B: CEO Functional Background 
Primary 
Functional 
Outgoing CEO New CEO Change in Function Total Freq. Percent Freq. Percent No Percent Yes Percent 
FDRMAJ 139 16.93 46 5.71 28 3.50% 109 13.64% 137 
OUTPUT 94 11.45 117 14.52 22 2.75% 69 8.64% 91 
THRPUT 413 50.3 444 55.09 238 29.79% 161 20.15% 399 
PERIPH 175 21.32 199 24.69 61 7.63% 111 13.89% 172 
Total 821 100 806 100 349 43.68% 450 56.32% 799 
 
Panel C: CEO Educational Background 
Degree Outgoing CEO New CEO Change in Degree Total Freq. Percent Freq. Percent No Percent Yes Percent 
NODEGR 17 2.26 6 0.8 0 0.00% 12 1.76% 12 
UNDER 324 43.03 253 33.91 106 15.54% 182 26.69% 288 
MASTER 376 49.93 444 59.52 206 30.21% 143 20.97% 349 
PHD 36 4.78 43 5.76 2 0.29% 31 4.55% 33 
Total 753 100 746 100 314 46.04% 368 53.96% 682 
 
Panel D: CEO Ivy League Affiliation 
IVY Outgoing CEO New CEO Change in Degree Total Freq. Percent Freq. Percent No Percent Yes Percent 
Yes 183 24.37% 182 24.36% 49 7.18% 123 18.04% 172 
No 568 75.63% 565 75.63% 386 56.60% 124 18.18% 510 
Total 751 100% 747 100% 435 63.78% 247 36.22% 682 
 
Panel E: Successions by year 
Year Freq. Percent 
1991 12 1.44 
1992 32 3.85 
1993 87 10.46 
1994 115 13.82 
1995 119 14.3 
1996 107 12.86 
1997 135 16.23 
1998 57 6.85 
1999 11 1.32 
2000 23 2.76 
2001 16 1.92 
2002 23 2.76 
2003 16 1.92 
2004 13 1.56 
2005 24 2.88 
2006 16 1.92 
2007 18 2.16 
2008 7 0.84 
2009 1 0.12 
Total 832 100 
 
(Table 2 continued on next page) 
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(Table 2 continued) 
 
Panel F: Successions by Fama and French (1997) 17 industry classification 
Fama-French (17) Industry Freq. Percent 
Food 26 3.25 
Mining and Minerals 8 1.00 
Oil and Petroleum Products 22 2.75 
Textiles, Apparel & Footware 19 2.38 
Consumer Durables 17 2.13 
Chemicals 28 3.50 
Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 38 4.76 
Construction and Construction Materials 27 3.38 
Steel Works Etc 22 2.75 
Fabricated Products 8 1.00 
Machinery and Business Equipment 106 13.27 
Automobiles 25 3.13 
Transportation 37 4.63 
Utilities 67 8.39 
Retail Stores 69 8.64 
Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other Fin. 34 4.26 
Other 246 30.79 
Total 799 100.00 
 
RESULTS 
 
Determinants of New CEO Pedigree 
 
We begin our analysis by examining the determinants of new CEO functional or educational background. We expect 
that the board of directors will seek to hire a new CEO with a background that best fits with the structural or cultural 
characteristics of the firm. Therefore, we examine whether characteristics of the outgoing CEO or firm affect the 
probability of the new CEO having a specific functional or educational background. 
 
We use a multinomial logit model which simultaneously estimates binary logit models for all comparisons (i.e., 
CEO pedigree classifications). The multinomial logit model can be written as: 
 ln 𝛺$ % 𝑥′( = ln *+,(./$ 0,1)*+,(./% 0,1) = 𝑥′(𝛽$ % (1) 
 
for m = 1 to J, where m indexes categories, b is the base category, and 𝑥′( are case specific regressors (a constant, 
RET12t-1, ROAt-1,TD/TAt-1, LNSALESt-1, Qt-1, R&D/SALESt-1, ADV/SALESt-1, SDRET36t-1, OAGE, OTENURE, 
NUMSUCC). As ln 𝛺% % 𝑥  = ln 1 = 0, it must hold that 𝛽% % = 0. Therefore, the log odds of an outcome variable 
with itself is always 0, as is the effect of any independent variables. The J equations can be solved to compute the 
predicted probabilities: 
 Prq(𝑦 = 𝑚 𝑥′() = 	 ;<=/(0,1>? @);<=A(0,1>B @)CBDE  (2) 
 
This model ensures that 0 < Pr 𝑦 = 𝑚 𝑥,( < 1, and Pr 𝑦 = 𝑚 𝑥,(HI/A  = 1. We could have estimated each of the 
categories using a series of individual binary logit models, but the disadvantage of this procedure is that each binary 
logit comparing the predicted probabilities of one group to another would be based on a different sample (Long and 
Freese, 2006). For example, a binary logit model comparing the predicted probabilities of OUTPUT to THRPUT 
would have a different number of observations than one comparing OUTPUT to PERIPH or THRPUT to PERIPH. 
The remaining observations pertaining to the non-comparison groups in each binary logit would be excluded from 
analysis. The multinomial logit model allows us to overcome this limitation. Here and throughout we cluster 
standard errors at the industry level. 
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Determinants of New CEO Background 
 
Table 3 reports results using CEO functional background as the dependent variable. We report average marginal 
effects (or discrete changes for binary variables), which describe how each of our independent variables affect the 
probability of the new CEO being in the functional categories of output, throughput, or peripheral.9 Here and 
throughout we cluster standard errors at the industry level. Columns 1 – 4 contain estimated results including 
dummy variables for the outgoing CEO’s functional background and firm specific control variables.10 
 
Table 3. Multinomial logit regressions on new CEO functional background 
 
(1) 
New 
CEO = FNDMAJ 
(2) 
New 
CEO = OUTPUT 
(3) 
New 
CEO = THRPUT 
(4) 
New 
CEO = PERIPH 
FDRMAJ 0.0546*** 0.00705 −0.00262 −0.0590 (2.98) (0.16) (−0.04) (−1.08) 
OUTPUT 0.0304 0.0791** 0.0571 −0.167** (1.34) (2.11) (0.86) (−2.49) 
PERIPH −0.0526 −0.0138 −0.0206 0.0869** (−1.48) (−0.37) (−0.39) (2.16) 
LR Test x2= 28.991***    
RET12t-1 
0.0185 −0.0686* 0.00773 0.0424 
(1.29) (−1.71) (0.16) (1.02) 
ROAt-1 −0.000459 0.00189 0.00511** −0.00654*** (−0.51) (1.04) (2.15) (−3.17) 
TD/TAt-1 
0.000144 −0.00103 0.000571 0.000319 
(0.23) (−1.26) (0.50) (0.30) 
LNSALESt-1 
−0.0173* 0.0134 0.00777 −0.00384 
(−1.90) (1.44) (0.58) (−0.33) 
Qt-1 0.000153 0.0232 
−0.0321 0.00879 
(0.01) (1.50) (−1.36) (0.39) 
R&D/SALESt-1 −0.000572 
−0.00651* 0.0107*** −0.00360 
(−0.49) (−1.83) (3.24) (−1.34) 
ADV/SALESt-1 −0.00210 0.00741* 
−0.0178** 0.0125** 
(−0.76) (1.69) (−2.26) (2.03) 
SDRET36t-1 0.0543 
−0.0938 0.186 −0.146 
(0.92) (−0.92) (1.37) (−1.19) 
OAGE 0.00207** 
−0.00301 0.00387 −0.00293 
(2.00) (−1.40) (1.30) (−1.10) 
OTENURE 0.000129 0.000682 
−0.00582** 0.00501** 
(0.15) (0.33) (−2.04) (2.03) 
NUMSUCC 0.0140 0.00358 0.00337 −0.0210 (0.86) (0.15) (0.10) (−0.68) 
FORCED 0.0718* 0.00415 
−0.174*** 0.0978 
(1.66) (0.09) (−2.65) (1.49) 
OUTSIDE −0.0644*** 0.00521 0.135*** −0.0757** (−5.18) (0.17) (3.20) (−2.12) 
N 660 660 660 660 
Heteroskedasticity robust t−statistics clustered at the industry level are given in parentheses. 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Our results support H1a, which predicts that the new CEO is likely to have a functional background that is similar to 
the predecessor’s background. The estimated coefficient on FNDMAJ is positive and significant in column 1, which 
estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO is a founder, co-founder, founding family member, majority 
shareholder, or member of majority shareholding family. Firms are more likely to hire a new CEO that is a founder 
or majority shareholder when the outgoing CEO is also a founder or majority shareholder. The probability that the 
new CEO is a founder or majority shareholder is 0.05 greater if the outgoing CEO is a founder or majority 
shareholder, averaged over the estimation sample. The estimated coefficient on OUTPUT is positive and significant 
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in column 2, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has an output functional background. 
Firms are more likely to hire a new CEO with an output functional background when the outgoing CEO also has an 
output functional background. The probability that the new CEO has an output functional background is 0.08 greater 
if the outgoing CEO also has an output functional background, averaged over the estimation sample. Similarly, the 
estimated coefficient on PERIPH is positive and significant in column 4, which estimates the predicted probability 
that the new CEO has a peripheral functional background. The probability that the new CEO has a peripheral 
functional background is 0.09 greater if the outgoing CEO also has a peripheral functional background, averaged 
over the estimation sample. Lastly, a likelihood ratio test of the joint significance of the outgoing CEO functional 
background dummies in the multinomial model is significant (χ2 = 28.991). This provides additional support that 
outgoing CEO functional background is a predictor of new CEO functional background. Our results suggest that the 
pedigree of the former CEO is a predictor of the organizational fit of the new CEO. Firms are more likely to hire 
new CEOs with functional backgrounds similar to the outgoing CEO. 
 
Our results also provide support for a matching of new CEO background to observable firm characteristics. 
 
The estimated coefficient on RD/SALES is negative and significant in column 2, but positive and significant in 
column 3, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has a throughput functional background. 
Firms with higher levels of R&D expenditures are less likely to hire a new CEO with an output background, but 
more likely to hire a new CEO with the operations, R&D, or engineering background necessary to manage the firm. 
A one unit change in R&D expenditures is associated with a 0.01 lower probability of the new CEO having an 
output background and a 0.01 higher probability of the new CEO having a throughput background, averaged over 
the estimation sample. Conversely, the estimated coefficient on ADV/SALES is negative and significant in column 
3, but positive and significant in columns 2 and 4. Firms with higher levels of Advertising expenditures are less 
likely to hire a new CEO with a throughput functional background, but more likely to hire a new CEO with an 
output or peripheral functional background. A one unit change in Advertising expenditures is associated with a 0.02 
lower probability of the new CEO having a throughput background, a 0.01 higher probability of the new CEO 
having an output background, and a 0.01 higher probability of the new CEO having a peripheral background, 
averaged over the estimation sample. 
 
The estimated coefficient on ROA is positive and significant in column 3, which estimates the predicted probability 
that the new CEO has a throughput functional background. More profitable firms (firms with higher ROA) are more 
likely to hire a new CEO with a throughput background. A one unit increase in ROA is associated with a 0.005 
higher probability of the CEO having a throughput background, averaged over the estimation sample. However, the 
estimated coefficient on ROA is negative and significant in column 4, which estimates the predicted probability that 
the new CEO has a peripheral functional background. Firms with lower levels of profitability (ROA) are more likely 
to hire a new CEO with finance or accounting backgrounds. This may suggest the willingness of the firm to bring in 
a new CEO with the necessary financial background to improve accounting performance. A one unit increase in 
ROA is associated with a 0.007 lower probability of the CEO having a peripheral background, averaged over the 
estimation sample. 
 
We next examine whether the nature of the succession, voluntary versus forced and inside versus outside succession, 
are predictors of the functional background of the new CEO. The estimated coefficient on FORCED is positive and 
significant in column 1, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO is a founder or majority 
shareholder. Forced successions are more likely to involve a new CEO that is a founder or majority shareholder. 
Conversely, the estimated coefficient on FORCED is negative and significant in column 3, which estimates the 
predicted probability that the new CEO has a throughput functional background. Forced successions are less likely 
to involve a new CEO with a throughput background. A discrete change from voluntary to forced succession is 
associated with a 0.17 lower probability of the CEO having a throughput background, averaged over the estimation 
sample. 
 
Further, the estimated coefficient on OUTSIDE is positive and significant in column 3, which estimates the 
predicted probability that the new CEO has a throughput functional background. New CEOs with a throughput 
background are more likely to come from outside the firm. However, the estimated coefficient on OUTSIDE is 
negative and significant in columns 1 and 4, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO is a founder 
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or majority shareholder or has a peripheral functional background, respectively. Outside successions are less likely 
to involve a new CEO who is a founder or majority shareholder or has a peripheral background. A discrete change 
from inside to outside succession is associated with a 0.06 (0.08) lower probability of the CEO being a founder or 
majority shareholder (having a peripheral background), averaged over the estimation sample. 
 
Lastly, we examine whether outgoing CEO characteristics, such as age or tenure, or the number of successions 
within the firm over our sample period (NUMSUC) are predictors of the functional background of the new CEO. 
The estimated coefficient on OTENURE is negative and significant in column 3, which estimates the predicted 
probability that the new CEO has a throughput functional background. Firms are less likely to hire a new CEO with 
a throughput background when the outgoing CEO has longer tenure. A one unit increase in outgoing CEO tenure is 
associated with a 0.006 lower probability of the CEO having a throughput background, averaged over the estimation 
sample. Conversely, the estimated coefficient on OTENURE is positive and significant in column 4, which 
estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has a peripheral functional background. Firms are more likely 
to hire new CEO with a peripheral background when the outgoing CEO has longer tenure. A one unit increase in 
outgoing CEO tenure is associated with a 0.005 higher probability of the CEO having a peripheral background, 
averaged over the estimation sample. 
 
Determinants of New CEO Degree 
 
Table 4 reports results for a binary logit model using CEO degree as the dependent variable. Column 1 contains 
estimated results of a binary logit regression using an indicator for whether the new CEO has a graduate degree as 
the dependent variable (GRADUATE) and the independent variables are as in model (1). Column 2 contains 
estimated results of a binary logit regression using an indicator for whether the new CEO has an Ivy League degree 
as the dependent variable (IVY) and the independent variables are as in model (1). We report average marginal 
effects (or discrete changes for binary variables), which describe how each of our independent variables affect the 
probability of the new CEO having a graduate degree or an Ivy League degree. 
 
Table 4. Multinomial logit regressions on new CEO degree 
 (1) New CEO = Graduate Degree (2) New CEO = Ivy Degree 
GRADUATE 0.0527  (1.35)  
IVY  0.0510  (1.53) 
RET12t-1 
−0.0104 −0.0354 
(−0.20) (−0.65) 
ROAt-1 −0.00350 −0.00258 (−1.43) (−1.60) 
TD/TAt-1 −0.000977 −0.00255** (−0.94) (−2.21) 
LNSALESt-1 
0.0203* 0.0104 
(1.68) (0.72) 
Qt-1 
0.0296 0.0104 
(1.60) (0.88) 
R&D/SALESt-1 
0.00634 0.0000735 
(1.36) (0.19) 
ADV/SALESt-1 0.000867 0.00430 (0.09) (0.73) 
SDRET36t-1 
−0.237 −0.458*** 
(−1.50) (−2.94) 
OAGE −0.00163 0.00138 (−0.46) (0.44) 
OTENURE 0.00352 −0.00141 
(1.06) (−0.56) 
NUMSUCC 0.0281 −0.00643 
(0.76) (−0.15) 
(Table 4 continued on next page) 
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(Table 4 continued) 
 
 (1) New CEO = Graduate Degree (2) New CEO = Ivy Degree 
FORCED −0.151** 0.111 (−2.08) (1.25) 
OUTSIDE 0.0343 0.0362 (0.89) (0.78) 
N 573 560 
Heteroskedasticity robust t−statistics clustered at the industry level are given in parentheses. *p < .05; **p 
< .01; ***p < .001 
 
Column 1 contains estimated results for change in CEO functional background. The estimated coefficients on the 
dummy variables for FNDMAJ, OUTPUT, and PERIPHERAL are significant. Firms with outgoing CEOs with 
these three functional backgrounds are more likely to make a change in functional background. This result is 
consistent with a majority of CEOs in our sample having a throughput functional background (the reference group). 
None of the estimated coefficients on board of director characteristics, board size (BDSIZE) and the percentage of 
independent directors (PIND) are significant with the exception of a negative and marginally significant estimated 
coefficient on DUALITY. Similarly, the estimated coefficient on the percentage of shares held by institutional 
shareholders (INSTOWN) is not significant. Examining the performance measures, the estimated coefficients on 
RET12 and ROA are negative and significant. Worse performing firms have higher probabilities of changing CEO 
functional backgrounds. For the average firm, a 1 unit increase in prior 12-month cumulative annualized stock return 
decreases the probability of a change in CEO functional background by 0.15, while a 1 unit increase in prior ROA 
decreases the probability of a change in CEO functional background by 0.006, holding all other variables at their 
mean. 
 
As the previous results suggest, a change in CEO functional background may be conditional on firm performance. 
As such, the board of directors or institutional owners may exert greater influence when the firm exhibits poor prior 
performance. Therefore, column 2 contains estimated results for change in CEO functional background conditional 
on the firm having a negative prior 12-month cumulative annualized return (RET12 < 0). Again, none of the 
estimated coefficients on board of director characteristics (BDSIZE and PIND) are significant. However, the 
estimated coefficient on DUALITY is now negative and significant at the 0.01 level. For the average firm, a discrete 
change from a separate CEO and Chairman of the board (COB) to the CEO also holding the title of COB decreases 
probability of a change in CEO functional background by 0.20. Further, the estimated coefficient on INSTOWN is 
now positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Firms with higher levels of INSTOWN and poor prior stock 
performance have a higher probability of changing CEO functional background. For the average firm, a 1 unit 
increase in institutional ownership percentage increases the probability of a change in CEO functional background 
by 0.006, holding all other variables at their mean. 
 
Column 3 contains estimated results where change in CEO degree is the dependent variable. The estimated 
coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the outgoing CEO has a graduate degree (GRADUATE) is negative 
and significant. This suggests that when the outgoing CEO has a graduate degree firms are less likely to hire a less 
educated CEO (i.e., one with only an undergraduate degree). None of the estimated coefficients on board of director 
characteristics (BDSIZE, PIND, or DUALITY) or institutional ownership (INSTOWN) are significant. In contrast to 
the results of change in functional background, the estimated coefficients on RET12 and ROA are also not 
significant. Prior performance is not a significant predictor of change in CEO degree. Further, Column 4 contains 
estimated results for change in CEO degree conditional on the firm having a negative prior 12-month cumulative 
annualized return. None of the estimated coefficients on board of director characteristics (BDSIZE, PIND, or 
DUALITY) or institutional ownership (INSTOWN) are significant. 
 
Finally, Column 5 contains estimated results where change in CEO Ivy League affiliation is the dependent variable. 
The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the outgoing CEO has a degree from an Ivy League 
institution (IVY) is positive and significant. This suggests that when the outgoing CEO has a degree from an Ivy 
League institution the firm is more likely to hire a new CEO without an Ivy League degree. None of the estimated 
coefficients on board of director characteristics (BDSIZE, PIND, or DUALITY) are significant. However, the 
estimated coefficient on institutional ownership (INSTOWN) is negative and significant. Firms with higher levels of 
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institutional ownership are less likely to make a change in CEO Ivy League affiliation. Similar to the results for 
change in degree, the estimated coefficients on RET12 and ROA are not significant. Prior performance is not a 
significant predictor of change in CEO Ivy League affiliation. However, the estimated coefficient on FORCED is 
positive and significant. Firms are more likely to make a change in Ivy League affiliation when the CEO is forcibly 
removed from office. For the average firm, a discrete change from voluntary to forced succession increases the 
probability of a change in CEO Ivy League affiliation by 0.14. Lastly, Column 6 contains estimated results for 
change in CEO Ivy League affiliation conditional on the firm having a negative prior 12-month cumulative 
annualized return. None of the estimated coefficients on board of director characteristics, board size (BDSIZE) and 
percentage of independent directors (PIND) are significant with the exception of a positive and marginally 
significant estimated coefficient on DUALITY. The estimated coefficient on institutional ownership (INSTOWN) 
remains negative and marginally significant. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper, we address two research questions. The first question is whether firm or predecessor characteristics are 
associated with a board of director’s choice of successor CEO functional background or education level. We find 
evidence that predecessor characteristics influence successor CEO functional background, but no convincing 
evidence that they influence the successor CEO education level. However, there are several firm characteristics that 
influence the choice of successor. First, we find a strong and consistent relation between a company’s ratio of R&D 
to sales with the choice of a successor that has a “throughput” functional background. 
 
That is, companies that engage in significant R&D tend to hire CEOs that have come from operations, research and 
development and engineering. The implications of these findings are that firms that are research driven tend to want 
CEOs that are familiar with and have the knowledge base to understand the company’s research. Also, we find that 
firms with low prior profitability are more likely to hire a successor CEO with a finance/accounting background. 
 
This is contrary to prior research that shows a tendency for non-profitable firms to hire CEOs with throughput 
functional backgrounds (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Guthrie and Datta, 1997). 
 
Our second research question is what firm characteristics influence a company to hire a successor with a different 
functional background than that of the predecessor. We find that changes from successor to predecessor functional 
background occur more often in firms that are performing poorly and when the firm has higher institutional investor 
ownership. The implications of these findings are that boards that are unhappy with a predecessor CEO seek 
successors with different skill sets. This finding is consistent with the body of prior research that has found that 
firms needing a change hire outside successors.  Needing a change also seems to lead firms to hire CEOs with 
different skill sets than that of the predecessor. 
 
The paper makes a contribution to the management and corporate finance literature by considering firm 
characteristics as motivators for the CEO hires rather than the outcome of hiring decisions. Another contribution of 
the paper is examining whether firms match the incoming CEO background with the outgoing CEO background. 
The paper has implications for the board of directors. Our results should shed light on how boards can use firm 
characteristics and outgoing CEO characteristics to motivate the incoming CEO characteristics. 
 
Future Research 
 
An area for future research could be the direction of causality between CEO personality and background on one 
hand and corporate growth and managerial decision making on the other hand. That is to say, do CEOs choose the 
kind of companies that they are comfortable running or do companies choose CEOs with characteristics that fit the 
company profile. This issue relates to the prior literature that argues for the existence of a firm’s footprint which 
perpetuates through time (Caves, 1998; Klepper, 2002; Lemmon et al., 2008). 
 
Limitations 
 
The paper does have some limitations. Our sample includes medium and large publicly traded firms. As a result, the 
sample does not include small and privately held firms. In addition, any classification scheme that codes CEO 
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successions as voluntary or forced is inherently subjective in nature. Occasionally, it is difficult to state with 
absolute certainty whether a CEO succession is forced or voluntary. 
 
Another limitation of our paper is that it analyzes only one side of the CEO matching process. For example in 
Hypothesis 2, we argue that the likelihood of a change in CEO background is greater when the board of directors 
faces greater pressure to make a change. Let us suppose that a firm has indeed performed poorly in the past and the 
board has forced out the CEO. It is possible that the board has tried to hire a different CEO with the same 
background as the previous CEO (contrary to our hypothesis) but none of them would accept. To put it more 
succinctly, one of the limitations of our paper is that we do not have data on the other side of the match - how many 
CEOs were approached by the board before one said yes. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 In unreported tests we do not find evidence that changing the functional background and/or the education level of 
the successor CEO improves or worsens firm performance. 
 
2 Unlike prior research, our paper examines the link between the outgoing and incoming CEO educational 
background. 
 
3 Guthrie and Datta (1997) find a strong relation between investments in marketing and promotion after hiring a 
CEO with a background in sales and marketing. Our paper examines whether firms with high advertising expense, 
for example, are more likely to hire a CEO with a sales and marketing background. 
 
4 We attempt to reduce the selection bias issue (Heckman, 1979) by randomly selecting 940 successions of the 1,877 
successions available. However, when we generate a sample by selecting firms that have engaged in a succession 
there will be an unavoidable selection bias. For one thing, successor availability is a critical issue that affects not 
only successor characteristics, but the existence of the succession event in the first place. 
 
5 We extend the RiskMetrics data with Equilar data for the S&P 1500 for the last two years of our sample period. 
 
6 The RiskMetrics IRRC proxy database reports the year using the meeting date. We assume that the proxy date is 
approximately 3 months after fiscal year end and the meeting date follows by 1 month. So, firms with fiscal years 
ending in December 1995 will be matched with IRRC observations with meeting dates in April 1996 or earlier. 
 
7 Only 17 outgoing CEOs and 6 new CEOs are classified as having no college degree, while only 43 outgoing CEOs 
and 43 new CEOs are classified as having a PhD. 
 
8 We consider the age 60 to be the normal retirement age for a CEO as in Parrino (1997). 
 
9 We report average marginal effects rather than marginal effects at the mean because sample means may reflect 
nonsensical or nonexistent observations, such as in the case of dummy variables (Long, 1997). We report discrete 
changes for dummy variables which measure the change in the probability as the indicator variable goes from 0 to 1, 
holding all other variables at their mean. 
 
10 We exclude board of director characteristics from our analysis in Tables 3 and 4 because including board 
characteristics dramatically reduces our sample size (by close to 50%). Also, we are unaware of a theoretical 
justification for board and other governance characteristics influencing the background of the CEO. 
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